Remilitarization of the Rhineland :: essays research papers

Question 2323.     With dictators, nothing succeeds like success. That observation, by Adolf Hitler, is not as trite as it sounds. Hitler was referring to his own successful remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. to begin with he moved into the Rhineland, Hitler was securely "in his box". Pursuant to the Versailles accordance and the Locarno pact of 1926, Germany had been forced to keep this territory demilitarized as a guarantee against renewed aggression futhermore, an unguarded Rhineland left Germany naked to a cut attack. From the German point of view, this was not "fair" it violated German sovereignty. provided it was the price Germany paid for invading France and the low countries in 1914. And it was the lid on the box that contained Hitlers grand strategic ambition.      In March of 1936 Hitler decided to ringlet butterfly the dice and take an extremely perilous venture (Goff. 235). Hitlers reason for miserable into the Rhinland was a ratification one month earlier of a interchangeable assistance pact between France and Russia that he felt was aimed at Germany (Medlicott 84-90, 110). Hitler cited the vulgar non-aggresion pact as violating and therefore invalidating the Locarno Treaty (Winton 1). Hitler was weak. Germany was still fight through the Depression and Germanys armed forces were still in pitiful shape, dispiritedly outgunned by the French. Had the French army responded in force to the remilitarization, had it simply marched into the Rhineland, Hitler would nominate had to retreat. Hitler later declared "If the French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would carry had to withdraw with our dog between our legs" (Goff 236). A retreat on the German part would have signified collapse, possibly the collapse of Hitlers rule. However, Hitler felt the French would be indispose and not act upon his move...and he was right.     The militarization of t he Rhineland was a direct louse up to French security. It rendered worthless the promises of military aid by France to her eastern European allies Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania if any of them were attacked by Germany (Medlicott 84-90, 110) .There were numerous reasons why France and Great Britain did not retaliate, but the most prevalent are as follows                1. a authentic hatred for war by those who remembered WWI. This was accompinied           by a non-enthusiastic attitude toward glowering military spending.                          2. a, perhaps, repentful attitude by Britain toward Germany because they felt they           were dealt with too harshly at Versailles therefore their desire for revision was    &nb sp           understandable.